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INTRODUCTION  
An exoneree of a wrongful conviction who is released from prison has 
three basic routes to recovery in most states: he can file a civil rights law-
suit, he can present a private bill to the legislature, or he can obtain relief 
through a state compensation statute if the incident occurred in one of the 
thirty states with a statute enacted.1 Victims who seek relief through state 
compensation statutes are more likely to receive some form of compensa-
tion, due to the length of time and amount of money that special legislation 
and civil rights lawsuits require.2 Civil rights lawsuits are often barred on 
procedural and immunity grounds, and special legislation requires an ex-
tended period of time, a large sum of money, and political influence. 
In the current criminal justice system, it is unlikely that wrongful convic-
tions will cease to be a problem. Due to the legal standards in trials, jury 
bias, and current laws that allow forms of government and police miscon-
duct with no punishment; there seems to be no way to positively identify 
criminals without mistakenly convicting an innocent person. The United 
States legal system, in theory, favors defendants, but in reality shows bias in 
favor of the government. Causes of wrongful convictions, including but not 
limited to a lack of DNA evidence, mistaken eye witness testimony, and 
prosecutorial and police misconduct, will not dissipate until laws are in 
place to protect the accused. States need to make strides to correct the dam-
age caused by incarcerating an innocent individual. However, only thirty 
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system attempt to repair 
damage to victims of wrongful conviction through enacted compensation 
statutes. Even in states that do have statutory relief in place, the award is 
often mediocre and does not adequately compensate the individual. State 
remedies vary in the amount of monetary damages available, and very few 
states offer any type of noneconomic damages. The current system for 
compensating victims of wrongful incarceration is insufficient to meaning-
fully repair the harm done to exonerees. This comment argues that the best 
attempt for a state to correct the damage is to borrow from principles of tort 
law and enact comprehensive statutory schemes in order to make victims of 
wrongful incarceration whole again. 
Comprehensive and holistic state compensation statues should be enacted 
on grounds of fairness and justice to make victims who are wrongfully con-
victed and exonerated whole again to the best of a state’s ability. Ideal stat-
																																																													
1 John Shaw, Note, Exoneration and the Road to Compensation: The Tim Cole Act and Comprehensive 
Compensation for Persons Wrongfully Imprisoned, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 593, 601 (2011).  
2 Id.  
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utes would provide economic and noneconomic damages in order to re-
integrate an innocent person into society. States have a responsibility to 
fully compensate those who are injured as a result of the state’s legal sys-
tem. A legal system that is inaccurate loses validity in the eyes of citizens; 
therefore, states must take sufficient measures to validate the system when 
it fails. This may be accomplished through comprehensive statute reform.  
A state’s legitimacy and ideals of justice require holistic compensation. 
Part I of this comment presents a brief overview of the current state 
compensation systems for those who are wrongly imprisoned, including 
model legislation proposed by the Innocence Project and the current short-
comings of compensation statutes across the United States. Part II discusses 
the principles behind compensatory damages in tort law, and the foundation 
and reasoning for making a victim whole again. Varying forms of relief are 
also discussed. Part III applies these principles of tort law to the arena of 
wrongful convictions to show states have a responsibility to make victims 
of wrongful convictions whole again. Potential problems arising from this 
reform and suggested solutions to any of those problems are also addressed. 
This comment concludes with an emphasis on the legal importance of cor-
recting the injury done to innocent victims who are wrongfully incarcerated 
for crimes they did not commit. Innocent exonerees deserve to be placed in 
a similar position upon exoneration to where they could have been without 
the conviction. 
I. A SURVEY OF CURRENT STATE COMPENSATION STATUTES 
This section provides an overview of state compensation statues in the 
United States. Currently, only thirty states, the District of Columbia, and the 
federal system have compensation statutes enacted to give victims of 
wrongful conviction relief.3 States that do not have a compensation statute 
in place include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, and Wyoming.4 This section details each state’s compensatory relief 
showing the wide range of types of aid and the apparent shortcomings of 
some state statutes. 
																																																													
3 See Compensating the Innocent, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-
your-state-doing (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).  
4 Id.  
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A. States Providing Economic Relief Only 
States that provide only monetary compensation include: Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin.5 Alabama’s statute gives a minimum of $50,000 for each year of incar-
ceration to wrongfully convicted individuals. Any additional funds must be 
appropriated by the legislature through a private bill.6 In California, a 
claimant can receive up to $140 per day of incarceration.7 Connecticut pro-
vides no minimum or maximum award, and any award can be based on 
claims of loss of life, liberty, earnings, earning capacity, familial relation-
ships, reputation, pain and suffering, mental suffering, and attorney’s fees; 
the statute also specifies that expenses may include funds for employment 
training, counseling, and tuition.8 
The District of Columbia statute requires the claimant be pardoned or the 
conviction overturned on grounds of innocence, and the claimant must pro-
vide clear and convincing proof of innocence.9 Iowa provides $50 per day 
of incarceration, as well as lost wages up to $25,000 per year plus attor-
ney’s fees.10 In Maine, a victim may recover up to $300,000 upon receiving 
a pardon.11 Minnesota provides reimbursement for legal fees, as well as a 
minimum of $50,000 per year of incarceration with an additional $25,000 
per year of supervised release or listing on a sex offender registry.12 In Mis-
sissippi, a claimant is eligible for $50,000 per year of incarceration with a 
maximum award of $500,000.13  Missouri’s statute provides $50 per day of 
post-conviction confinement.14 Nebraska compensates victims for damages 
that are shown to proximately result from the conviction and limits the 
award to a maximum of $500,000.15 One of the most unfavorable statutes in 
																																																													
5 Id.  
6 ALA. CODE § 29-2-150 (2015).  
7 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2015).   
8 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102uu (2015).  
9 D.C. CODE § 2-422 (2015).  
10 IOWA CODE § 663A.1 (2015).  
11 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 8241 (2015).  
12 MINN. STAT. § 590.11 (2015).  
13 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7 (2015).  
14 MO. REV. STAT. § 650.058 (2015).  
15 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4604 (2015).  
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place is that of New Hampshire, offering only $20,000 for the entirety of 
the wrongful incarceration.16 
In New York, the court determines a fair and reasonable amount of dam-
ages for the victim..17 Ohio provides $40,330 per year of incarceration, as 
well as lost wages and attorney’s fees.18 Oklahoma’s statute offers $175,000 
for the entirety of the wrongful incarceration.19 Tennessee awards a total of 
$1,000,000 for the conviction’s entirety.20 In Utah, a claimant can receive 
the monetary equivalent of the average payroll wage in the state for each 
year of incarceration up to a maximum fifteen years.21 Virginia gives 90% 
of the Virginia per capita personal income per year of recovery as well as a 
tuition award of $10,000, but awards differ for victims exonerated through 
DNA evidence and exonerations through non-biological evidence.22 
Washington’s recovery includes $50,000 for each year in prison as well 
as time spent waiting for the trial, along with an additional $50,000 for each 
year on death row and $25,000 per year spent on parole, a community cus-
tody registry, or a sex offender registry; Washington also provides up to 
$75,000 for child support and attorney’s fees.23 In West Virginia, a claimant 
receives damages based on the court’s determination of fair and reasonable 
compensation.24 Finally, those wrongfully convicted in Wisconsin receive a 
maximum $25,000.25 
B. States Providing Economic and Noneconomic Relief 
States that provide monetary and noneconomic forms of relief include: 
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, Texas, and Vermont.26 Colorado provides 
compensation to a person or family member of a person who has been 
wrongfully incarcerated, exonerated, and found to be actually innocent; a 
claimant may receive $70,000 for each year of incarceration with an addi-
tional $50,000 each year spent on death row, plus tuition waivers and 
																																																													
16 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B_14 (2015).  
17 N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT LAW § 8-b (McKinney 2015).  
18 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48 (West 2015).  
19 OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154 (2015).  
20 TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108 (2015).  
21 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (West 2015).  
22 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11 (2015).  
23 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.100.060 (2015).  
24 W. VA. CODE § 14-2-13a (2015).  
25 WIS. STAT. § 775.05 (2015).  
26 How is Your State Doing?, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-your-
state-doing (following specific state hyperlinks) (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
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healthcare from the state.27 In Florida, an applicant can receive $50,000 per 
year of incarceration, with a maximum of $2,000,000 as well as reim-
bursement for fines and costs and 120 tuition hours.28 
The statute in Illinois provides for a total of $85,350 for imprisonment up 
to five years, $170,000 for imprisonment from five to fourteen years, and 
$199,150 for imprisonment of more than fourteen years; the statute also re-
imburses attorney’s fees up to a quarter of the compensation award and job 
search and placement services.29 Louisiana awards $25,000 per year of im-
prisonment with a maximum of $250,000 and also may include costs of job 
or skill training for three years, medical, and counseling services for up to 
six years, and tuition expenses.30 The Maryland compensation package in-
cludes a reasonable monetary amount plus counseling services.31 In Massa-
chusetts, a victim can be awarded up to $500,000 with consideration of 
physical, emotional, and educational services, plus the criminal record is 
expunged.32 
Montana offers only educational aid to victims of wrongful conviction.33 
In New Jersey, the statute awards compensation for double the amount of 
the individual’s income in the year prior to incarceration or $50,000 per 
year, whichever amount is greater, as well as vocational training, tuition as-
sistance, counseling, housing aid, and health insurance.34 North Carolina 
provides $50,000 per year of incarceration with a maximum amount of 
$750,000, as well as job skills training and tuition waivers.35 
Texas provides one of the most comprehensive statutes, providing 
$80,000 per year of imprisonment with an annuity, as well as an additional 
$25,000 per year on death row or registered as a sex offender, plus award-
ing compensation for child support, 120 hours of tuition, the opportunity to 
be a part of the Texas State Employee Health Plan, and other various re-
integration services.36 Lastly, in Vermont, a claimant can receive between 
$30,000 and $60,000 per year of incarceration as well as up to ten years of 
state health care, lost damages, reimbursement of attorney’s fees, re-
integration services, and mental and physical health care costs that occur 
																																																													
27 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-65-101 (2015).  
28 FLA. STAT. § 961.06 (2015).  
29 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8 (2015).  
30 LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 15:572.8 (2015).  
31 MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501 (LexisNexis, 2015). 
32 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, §§ 5,7 (West 2015).  
33 MONT. CODE ANN. §53-1-214 (2015).  
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C (West 2015).  
35 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-82 (West 2015).  
36 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001, 103.052–.054 (West 2015).  
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between the date of release and the date of the award; the statute also ex-
pressly stipulates that the award is not subject to state income taxes.37 
C. Limits on State Compensation Statutes 
State compensation statutes often limit compensation through multiple 
constraints and in many cases completely bar recovery.38 Some states pre-
clude recovery unless there is a pardon. In California, one can recover only 
if he did not plead guilty in order to protect another person from prosecu-
tion.39 The District of Columbia limits recovery by barring compensation if 
the claimant pled guilty.40 Iowa similarly precludes recovery if the applicant 
pled guilty.41 Minnesota only provides relief if a claim is filed within two 
years of the exoneree’s release.42 In Mississippi, there is a statutory limit on 
damages of $500,000 and a claimant can only recover if he files within 
three years of a pardon or an overturning of a conviction that is consistent 
with innocence.43 Nebraska’s statute only provides relief for damages that 
are shown to have proximately been the result of the wrongful imprison-
ment.44 New Hampshire requires that the Board of Claims find the individ-
ual innocent.45 In New York, the applicant must file within two years of a 
pardon and he must not have brought about the conviction by his own con-
duct.46 
Limited recovery is also found in Ohio where only those who did not 
plead guilty can recover as long as they file within two years of exonera-
tion.47 Oklahoma limits recovery to those who did not plead guilty and 
those not in prison for any other action.48 In Tennessee, only those who file 
a claim within one year of an exoneration or pardon can recover.49 Utah 
compensates only those who can show innocence by clear and convincing 
evidence.50 Virginia commands that the conviction be vacated and disquali-
fies recovery for those who pled guilty, unless charged with a capital of-
																																																													
37 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5572 (West 2015). 
38 Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (2015); D.C. CODE § 2-425 (2016). 
39 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (West 2015).   
40 D.C. CODE § 2-425 (2015).  
41 IOWA CODE § 663A.1 (2015). 
42 MINN. STAT.§ 590.11 (West 2015).  
43 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7, 11-44-9 (2015).  
44 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4604 (2015).  
45 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:9 (2015).  
46 N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT LAW § 8-b (McKinney 2015).  
47 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48 (West 2015).  
48 OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154 (2015).  
49 TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108 (2015).  
50 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-303 (West 2015).  
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fense.51 In West Virginia, those whose conduct brought about their own 
conviction are barred from recovery and the claim must be filed two years 
after the pardon or dismissal.52 Wisconsin also refuses relief to anyone who 
contributed to the conviction.53 
Many other states also place limits on recovery. In Florida, a claimant 
must be found innocent by a prosecuting attorney or administrative court.54 
Illinois requires a pardon by the Governor or a certificate of innocence from 
the Circuit Court.55 A claimant in Louisiana must prove factual innocence.56 
Maryland commands a Governor’s pardon.57 Massachusetts grants recovery 
only where the applicant files within two years of release, and the state re-
fuses recovery to those who pled guilty.58 Montana, offering only educa-
tional aid, limits those who can recover to those who are exonerated 
through post-conviction DNA testing.59 New Jersey precludes recovery to 
those who pled guilty and limits the time of recovery to two years of the re-
lease or pardon.60 North Carolina requires a pardon.61 Lastly, Vermont bars 
awards unless a claimant files within three years of the exoneration.62 
D. The Innocence Project Model Legislation for Compensation 
The Innocence Project, a national non-profit organization that assists 
wrongfully convicted individuals, provides a model statute for compensa-
tion which the organization believes adequately repairs the damage done to 
those wrongfully convicted. The legislation provides for services a victim 
can access immediately following release.63 The standard of proof recom-
mended is a preponderance of the evidence, and those eligible include re-
cipients of pardons, those whose judgments have been vacated or reversed, 
and anyone whose crime fell under a statute that violated a state or federal 
																																																													
51 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10 (2015). 
52 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (2015).  
53 WIS. STAT. § 775.05 (2015).  
54 FLA. STAT. § 961.03 (West 2015).  
55 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8 (2015).  
56 LA. STAT ANN. § 572.8 (2015).  
57 MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501 (West 2015).  
58 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, §§ 1,8 (2015).  
59 MONT. CODE ANN. §53-1-214 (2015).  
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3-4 (West 2015).  
61 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82 (2015).  
62 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5576 (2015).  
63 Model Legislation: An Act Concerning Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, THE 
INNOCENCE PROJECT 1 (DEC. 2014), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/imp 
rove-the-law/CompensationModelBill2015.pdf. 
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Constitution.64 The model statute does not preclude relief to those who 
falsely confessed or entered a guilty plea. The legislation expressly claims 
that damages should not be offset by the state, and includes a provision for 
automatic expunging of the criminal record if the claimant files within three 
years of the exoneration.65 
The model statute recommends a minimum $62,500 per year of impris-
onment, with an additional $62,500 per year on death row, and a minimum 
of $31,000 per year on parole, probation, or registered as a sex offender.66 
These damages should reflect consideration of lost wages, legal fees, medi-
cal, and dental expenses including physical injuries or sicknesses.67 Mone-
tary costs also include reimbursement for tuition and fees paid for education 
and children’s education.68 Damages include compensation for child sup-
port payments and compensation for housing, transportation, subsistence, 
mental and physical health care costs, and re-integration services.69 The 
award is not capped at any amount, and the award is not treated as taxable 
income.70 
If a conviction was reversed or vacated, the statute proposes three years 
of immediate services including housing, education, training, transportation, 
subsistence monetary aid, and re-integration services.71 Lastly, the statute 
provides a lifetime of physical and mental health care.72 Although the Inno-
cence Project’s model statute provides both monetary and economic com-
pensation, recovery under the statute does not achieve comprehensive and 
holistic relief. The recovery is still limited in time to those who file within 
three years, and limits persons who are eligible. Part IV, Section B of this 
comment discusses a more thorough and inclusive scheme of compensation 
that all states should adopt in order to truly compensate those who are 
wrongly incarcerated. 
																																																													
64 Id. at 2–3. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 6. 
67 Model Legislation: An Act Concerning Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, THE 
INNOCENCE PROJECT 1 (DEC. 2014), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/imp 
rove-the-law/CompensationModelBill2015.pdf. 
68 Id. 4–5. 
69 Id. at 5.  
70 Id. at 5–6.  
71 Id. at 9.  
72 Model Legislation: An Act Concerning Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, THE 
INNOCENCE PROJECT 1, 3–4 (DEC. 2014), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent 
/improve-the-law/CompensationModelBill2015.pdf. 
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E. Shortcomings in the Current System 
While some states provide noneconomic and economic relief for exon-
erees, there are major shortcomings in the system as a whole that would be 
addressed by enacting comprehensive statutes. The first major problem is 
that twenty states do not have any legislation in place for compensating the 
wrongfully convicted. In almost half of the United States, people who are 
wrongly incarcerated for crimes they did not commit are not guaranteed any 
recovery. In those jurisdictions, individuals have no outlet of relief aside 
from lawsuits and proposing legislation.73 The time and money that lawsuits 
and legislation require, coupled with the slim chances of recovery due to 
immunity statutes and politics, often leave victims in states lacking com-
pensation statutes empty handed. 
Because of the limits of state compensation statutes discussed in Part I, 
Section C of this comment, as well as procedural barriers and other bars to 
compensation, state statutes are sometimes an obstacle within themselves 
instead of serving as a meaningful way to repair damage done to those who 
have been innocently convicted of crimes they did not commit.74 These bar-
riers often make victims suffer even more to obtain compensation from a 
system that previously failed them.75 Shortcomings in the system not only 
interfere with principles of fairness and justice that govern compensating 
the wrongfully convicted, but also deteriorate the legitimacy of the system 
in the public’s eyes and the victim’s eyes.76 The lack of consistency in state 
compensation statutes across the United States also undermines the impor-
tance of repairing harm done to innocent people on behalf of the state 
whose system miscarried justice. 
II. PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW: MAKING THE VICTIM WHOLE AGAIN 
Tort law in the United States includes damages and theories behind these 
damages to compensate individuals who have been wronged. One goal of 
tort damages is to make the victim whole again by restoring him to the posi-
tion prior to the wrong done to him, thus in effect, making him as if the 
wrong never occurred.77 Certain remedies in tort law, such as compensatory 
damages, exist to restore an individual to this prior position. Remedies in 
																																																													
73 Shaw, supra note 1. 
74 Jean Coleman Blackerby, Note, Life After Death Row: Preventing Wrongful Capital Convictions and 
Restoring Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1179, 1219 (2003).  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 KAN. L. REV. 39, 45 (1994).  
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tort attempt “to make the victim of a wrong whole by providing him with 
the compensatory damages necessary for re-directing him, economically if 
not physically, from his post-wrong position back to the position he occu-
pied in the pre-wrong status quo.”78 
While the wrong committed to the victim is now part of history and can-
not be undone, compensatory damages seek to position the victim in a place 
as if the wrong had not occurred.79 Compensatory damages aim to correct 
the wrong and make the plaintiff whole, or leave the plaintiff in no worse 
condition following the defendant’s injury to the person, property, eco-
nomic interest, or rights than the plaintiff would have been in otherwise.80 
The purpose behind these types of damages is to give the victim a monetary 
award to restore him to the situation he would be in if the wrong was never 
committed.81 
Compensatory damages include, but are not limited to, property damage, 
lost wages, medical expenses, lost profits, value of destroyed goods, physi-
cal pain, mental suffering, lost financial support, and loss of consortium.82 
The standard calculation for compensatory damages is based on economic 
and noneconomic losses, both tangible and intangible.83 Damages flowing 
from injury to a person, which are recoverable, include physical and mental 
medical expenses and treatment, loss of earnings, impairment of earning 
capacity, loss of physical function, loss of services, education, aggravation 
of older mental or physical conditions, pain and suffering, emotional dis-
tress, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, grief, humiliation and 
loss of favorable reputation.84 Past and future losses and both are compen-
sated.85 Economic damages include, but are not limited to, loss of invest-
ments and the value thereof, loss of business, loss of profit, and loss due to 
delay86 These are commonly defined as objective and verifiable money 
losses while noneconomic damages are generally referred to as subjective 
																																																													
78 Avihay Dorfman, What is the Point of Tort Remedy?, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 105 (2010).  
79 Id. at 108.  
80 Damages, CORNELL UNIV. LEGAL INFO. INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/damages (last 
visited Apr.7, 2016).  
81 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.01 COMPENSATORY DAMAGES: INTRODUCTION (Matthew Bender 
2015). 
82 See id.  
83 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.04 PROVING THE DAMAGES TO BE COMPENSATED (Matthew Bender 
2015). 
84 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.03 PROVING THE UNDERLYING TORT (Matthew Bender 2015). 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
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and non-monetary losses.87 Compensatory damages awards consider any-
thing that might restore the victim to his pre-wronged position. 
While harms in the past may never be undone, tort remedies seek to re-
shape the present and future to seem more hopeful for an individual, and in 
this way try to undo the harm done.88 The goal is not to take away the in-
jury, but rather to pursue placing the victim in the same place as he was 
situated in before the injury occurred. “Our sense of fairness requires that, 
as a matter of ‘corrective justice,’ victims who suffer injury because their 
rights have been wrongly denied should have recourse to a system that re-
quires injurers to pay compensation.”89 No victim should suffer more in at-
tempting to recover for injuries. Damages should be provided using a holis-
tic method to give the plaintiff a sense of satisfaction even though the 
defendant mistreated him, and that satisfaction extends to any losses that 
occurred due to the mistreatment.90 
Two theories of tort law should be compared in the context awarding 
damages. One theory clings tightly to the belief of making the victim whole 
again views tort damages as stipulating to conditions under which a court 
should command someone to pay for the damage a claimant is facing.91 The 
other theory views tort law as simply wrongs and redress, obligating people 
to refrain from causing injuries to others and if an injury is caused, then re-
dress needs to be obtained and remedy is the main focus.92 Regardless of 
which theory is applied, there is a human need for harmed people to pursue 
vindication for their damage beyond meager compensation for the loss’s 
economic worth.93 This need is the underlying justification for intangible 
and noneconomic injuries. 
While the Supreme Court’s focus on damages in tort is typically punitive 
damages, the Court has repeatedly affirmed the theory behind compensa-
tory damages.94 “Compensatory damages are intended to redress the con-
crete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrong-
																																																													
87 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.05 ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC DAMAGES (Matthew Bender 
2015).   
88 Dorfman, supra note 78, at 108–109.  
89 F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
437, 446 (2006).   
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ful conduct.”95 Damages of this type can include a plaintiff’s own monetary 
loss as well as other economic harms, and also harms such as damage of 
reputation, personal embarrassment, and mental distress and suffering.96 
The Court has acknowledged that while deterrence is an important purpose 
of damages, it sometimes operates through use of compensatory damages 
that are founded in defining what a plaintiff actually lost.97.The principle of 
compensatory damages may be applied to wrongful conviction relief to 
provide an adequate remedy for wrongfully convicted victims. 
III. APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
A. Making Exonerees Whole Again 
States have a responsibility to make exonerees whole again by not only 
providing monetary compensation, but also affording noneconomic needs 
and access to services to address impacts of imprisonment.98 Prison affects 
every aspect of an exonerees life, including but not limited to his physical 
and mental well-being, employment, social ability, and relationships.99 “To 
properly account for systemic injustices and to restore public confidence in 
the judicial system, changes must occur to ensure that the wrongly con-
victed will be made as whole as possible after their release.”100 Making an 
exoneree whole is therefore not only crucial for the individual, but also 
critical in ensuring confidence in the legal system in the citizens’ eyes. In 
tort law, damages should not only be satisfactory for the victimization and 
harm itself but also should account for the mistreatment that occurred.101 
This theory should be applied to wrongful convictions. There is no doubt 
that exonerees are victimized by the system that wrongly convicted them; 
thus, damage awards should take responsibility for that as well as for the 
mistreatment to the individual because of the system’s uneven power bal-
ance. 
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In both tort law and wrongful convictions, there is difficulty assigning 
equivalence between economic damages and the injury to the victim.102 For 
this reason, noneconomic damages in tort law are awarded.103 This trans-
lates into the goal of damages for the wrongly convicted as well. “Money is 
not what makes individuals whole. The only way to truly restore individuals 
to any semblance of their previous lives is to reintegrate them into society 
so they can function as normal citizens.”104 After an individual has been in 
prison, regardless of the amount of time, he needs help readjusting back to 
life in society.105 This includes monetary assistance, educational assistance, 
physical or mental healthcare, and aid for other personal challenges. 
There is little to no assistance for the wrongfully convicted as they at-
tempt to re-enter society, but if tort principles were applied to exonerations, 
these individuals would have a chance to be fully reintegrated and restored 
to their pre-conviction situation.106 Providing integrative and assistive serv-
ices to exonerated persons is part of making a victim whole again and en-
suring an exoneree’s successful future.107 
It is a moral obligation on the part of the states that wrongfully convict 
an individual to compensate that victim. Corrective justice recognizes a re-
sponsibility to repair or “correct” an injury.108 “Under the corrective justice 
theory, imposing tort damages on individuals embodies a widely accepted 
moral obligation on the part of a wrongdoer to make the injured party 
whole.”109 This theory can be utilized regardless of whether blame is placed 
on the state for the wrongful conviction. The theory simply focuses on the 
victim: when a victim loses rights, there is a duty to fully restore him and 
his rights. This burden falls on the state in conviction cases because it is the 
state legal system that caused the damage. Therefore, the causation element 
is satisfied and corrective justice applies. Using corrective justice as a justi-
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fication for state compensation statutes would ensure a holistic and com-
prehensive damages plan to make exonerees whole again. 
The Supreme Court of the United States continually reaffirms the pur-
pose behind compensatory damages.110 There is not a set measure to deter-
mining compensation for pain and suffering, both physical and mental, or 
for the loss of time for a career, or for permanent physical injury.111 The 
Court has upheld general damages for proven and unproven injuries.112 
Damages for future pain and medical expenses have also been upheld by 
the Court wherever evidence shows future effects of an injury may occur.113 
“Compensation is a fundamental principle of damages.”114 When an injury 
occurs, a party is authorized to be placed in the same position as he would 
have been prior to the injury.115 This language reaffirms the central purpose 
behind compensation, to make a victim whole again. The understanding of 
this concept goes to proof of harm being offered so reasonable damages can 
be provided.116 It may be difficult to put an economic amount on certain 
types of damages, but “just because these rights are not capable of precise 
evaluation does not mean that an appropriate monetary amount should not 
be awarded.”117 
It is difficult to assess a proper compensation award for a person wrong-
fully convicted. However, an appropriate amount of compensation should 
still be awarded. Personal injury verdicts in Virginia span through wide 
ranges, but some plaintiffs recover millions of dollars for simple acci-
dents.118 As a point of comparison, in the same state, Victor Burnette re-
ceived $226,000 after losing eight years of his life due to a wrongful rape 
conviction.119 A verdict for 1.5 million dollars was upheld in a slip and fall 
case in Virginia in 1999.120 In the same state, Thomas Haynesworth recov-
ered just over one million dollars after spending twenty-seven years behind 
bars for a crime he did not commit.121 In Virginia, lack of medical diagnosis 
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can carry over 2.5 million dollars due to a shortened life expectancy, but 
losing twenty-seven years of a life receives millions less.122 This grotesque 
paradox is unacceptable and is clear evidence that state compensation stat-
ues need reform nationwide. 
B. Need for Comprehensive Legislation for Compensating Wrongful 
Convictions 
All states should adopt a holistic and comprehensive plan for compensat-
ing those individuals who have been wrongfully convicted on behalf of the 
state’s legal system. This section addresses some aspects of a holistic 
scheme, and shows why comprehensive plans are necessary. Monetary re-
lief is necessary to compensate victims, but money does not fully restore an 
exoneree. Economic damages fail to help with many problems victims face, 
such as a lack of job skills, lack of education, inexperience, mental and 
physical disorders, damaged reputation, lack of social or familial ties, and 
trouble adjusting to life outside prison.123 Therefore, comprehensive serv-
ices are necessary in order to restore those re-entering society as an inno-
cent victim the system betrayed. 
Noneconomic damages should be provided in the form of services. Some 
examples of needed assistance are employment training and counseling.124 
Everyday needs are often completely unavailable upon release. “The most 
daunting concerns for many of these exonerees are for the most basic and 
fundamental human needs such as housing, food, clothing, medical costs, 
transportation, identification documents, and other necessities.125 These 
needs are not considered in most statutes. Money also does not aid in job 
training and access to job services, psychological help, or medical help.126 
Financial awards can assist in opening the door to some of these amenities, 
but ultimately services need to be provided. Healthcare, job opportunities, 
and educational opportunities are fundamental services that victims need 
after prison release.127 Noneconomic damages in statutes should take into 
account “pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, physical im-
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pairment, loss of capacity to enjoy life, loss of reputation, [and] loss of con-
sortium, which may be substantial for the wrongly accused.”128 
The state can also provide other benefits to make victims whole again af-
ter suffering through wrongful incarceration. For instance, a false convic-
tion should automatically be expunged from the victim’s record as to not 
further impede a job search and to help reduce the stigma associated with 
criminal behavior.129 When an exoneration occurs without an expungement, 
it forces victims into explaining a false record to any potential employers. 
Additionally, a formal apology would assist in removing the label of 
“criminal” and disgrace associated with that label.130 
Furthermore, compensation statutes should be efficient, moving quickly 
without being procedurally barred. “Procedural fairness is a central problem 
with respect to exonerees, as wrongful convictions are often accompanied 
by unfair procedures.”131 When procedure fails an individual in the trial 
process, procedural barriers in the recovery process diminish hope of re-
turning to society normally. The need for these resources is immediate, and 
victims should not have to wait months or years to recover what is right-
fully theirs.132 These victims are tired of combatting the justice system and 
should not be forced to jump through hoops to be restored to justice.133 The 
claims should also be low cost, as the claimants often do not have money 
upon release.134 If a victim is exonerated but cannot afford to pursue com-
pensation, the statute fails the very purpose it exists. The criminal justice 
system should not be opposed to correcting factual errors, so there is no 
need for a war to prove innocence between exonerees and disapproving le-
gal standards, disinclined courts, flawed criminal investigations, insufficient 
representation, and a lack of resources.135 Accepting errors and correcting 
the damage is the first step to a successful criminal justice system. “Ideally, 
compensation statutes should provide generous, rapid, and certain damage 
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awards, accompanied by education and social services, for all those who 
have been wrongly convicted and later exonerated.”136 
In addition to providing services, economic damages should still serve as 
a major aspect of compensation statutes. Economic costs stem from hard-
ships incurred during incarceration, including lost opportunity, lost wages, 
and physical injury.137 For example, money can sufficiently compensate lost 
income. Having immediate access to funds makes a great impact on an ex-
oneree upon regaining their freedom. Awards that place exonerees in a 
well-enough position to achieve basic needs give victims a chance to sur-
vive without resorting to a life of crime.138 Economic needs should not be 
capped because needs differ based on different situations. “The statutory 
damage caps on compensation for the wrongly convicted implicate the 
same special legislation and separation of powers concerns that other courts 
have used to strike down other damages recovery caps.”139 A case-by-case 
approach for monetary awards is more appropriate. 
Effective and just compensation statutes ideally would be inclusive so 
that all deserving individuals may recover for the damage resulting from a 
wrongful conviction, and the relief should be meaningful so as to make the 
victims whole again.140 Because these victims face such severe injuries, jus-
tice demands increased compensation through economic damages and re-
medial services.141 Fair compensation statutes should include economic and 
noneconomic recovery to assist exonerees in every aspect of their new life. 
C. Potential Problems and Solutions 
States that do not wish to enact comprehensive compensation for victims 
of wrongful convictions will likely pose four main contentions with the 
proposed system. The first concern is the lack of justification for 
noneconomic damages. The second concern is funding and resources. 
Third, states may propose the cost of doing business argument, claiming 
they do not need to take responsibility for these wrongs. Lastly, states might 
attempt to argue that victims of this type cannot truly be made whole again, 
so the task is unachievable and a waste of money and resources. 
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Regarding the first of these concerns, opponents of noneconomic dam-
ages argue that these types of damages do not work in the system because 
they have no real dollar value to fix or replace the harm, money does not 
truly compensate, and there is no measure for noneconomic damages and 
thus an inconsistency in rewards; therefore, opponents argue noneconomic 
damages should not be included in rewards.142 This criticism is not applica-
ble to noneconomic damages awarded in wrongful conviction cases. Pain 
and mental trauma do have some calculable dollar value.143 These are real 
injuries that can be alleviated with services such as counseling and medical 
treatment. If comprehensive systems were in place, there would be a way to 
provide monetary compensation for pain and suffering while additionally 
offering a treatment based healing process. 
Money may truly compensate for types of noneconomic harm not pro-
vided by services. Monetary damages serve as a starting point for exonerees 
to begin again. Financial compensation, while only the first step in a holis-
tic recovery system, acts as a form of reparation in assisting victims as they 
start a new life. While monetary rewards play a significant role in making 
the victim whole again, a system with exclusively monetary rewards fails to 
fully compensate victims,144 
Finally, is possible to measure noneconomic harm as it relates to wrong-
ful convictions. Services that provide education, healthcare, financial assis-
tance, and other services are calculable and certain.145 Providing these serv-
ices to exonerees actually reduces the likelihood that a reward will be 
erratic and unpredictable.146 States would ideally have services in place be-
fore a victim needs to access them. If all of this were in place, simply wait-
ing for an exoneree to use them, there would be no chaos upon granting a 
victim access. The process would be very predictable and streamlined. For 
the reasons discussed, the criticisms of noneconomic damages do not relate 
to wrongful convictions. 
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Another concern is that states may lack the necessary funding and re-
sources to back comprehensive compensation statutes.147 If a state can pro-
vide services to criminals leaving jail, it surely can provide services to vic-
tims falsely accused of crimes leaving jail. “In an age when state 
governments willingly spend tens and hundreds of millions of dollars to try 
to positively reintegrate the justly convicted back into society, the unjustly 
convicted must scrape, toil, and fight for arguable paltry portions of state 
dollars to positively reintegrate them.”148  Some states provide compensa-
tion for innocent exonerees through the use of criminal fines collected 
through just convictions.149 Other states access money for damage awards 
through police and prosecutor budgets.150 If an exoneree were to file a civil 
suit, some entity of the government would pay for the judgment; therefore, 
states should embrace the obligation to award damages and thus, govern-
ments could better prepare for this payment instead of trying to deny recov-
ery.151 Scholars suggest that if the government was held liable in this way, 
there would be a real incentive for the government to avoid constitutional 
harms and make better future investments.152 
In the alternative, states could create a separate fund to cover compensa-
tion costs. If a fund were set up correctly, interest could be produced and 
the fund would replenish itself while providing victims with sufficient 
compensation.153 This would require a large initial investment by the state, 
but the state would not take a substantial hit every time a person became 
eligible for compensation and the states would be more prepared to provide 
more foreseeable and practicable damages.154 The state may also set up vic-
tim compensation funds. One example of such fund is the Feinberg fund 
compensated victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to avoid lawsuits while 
still adequately helping victims.155 This is an appropriate model for com-
prehensive statutes because the primary goal is to help victims; therefore, 
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there are no restrictions or caps on payments through the Feinberg fund.156 
These funds use the principles of tort law in their recovery, thus making 
them adaptable to wrongful convictions.157 The 9/11 compensation fund 
was based on donations, but the state could appropriate funds to take re-
sponsibility for injustices the state caused. 
These types of funds are specially targeted toward handling fragile vic-
tims, and allow victims to tell their story in a meaningful way and receive 
compensation.158 The method behind the funding is determining how much 
life is truly worth.159 This is directly applicable to wrongful convictions, as 
these victims lost years of their life and all of the opportunities included in 
those years. While these types of funds acknowledge that money is a poor 
substitute for loss, they calculate awards based on what the victim would 
have earned over a lifetime if it were not for the tragedy, as well as provid-
ing additional funds for pain and suffering and other circumstances.160 The 
fund offers free financial advice to eligible victims.161 For exonerees re-
leased from prison, this is a necessary service that should be available on 
behalf of the state. States could operate compensation systems by using a 
victim compensation fund similar to the Feinberg fund from 9/11 to create 
more predictable and meaningful damages.162 “The number of wrongfully 
convicted individuals is not high enough to seriously burden state treasur-
ies.”163 Therefore, the excuse of a lack of funding is not sufficient for a 
state’s failure to enact comprehensive compensation statues. 
Comprehensive statutes would ideally also require noneconomic re-
sources for the wrongfully convicted. States already have systems in place 
for those on welfare and justly convicted persons re-entering society; there-
fore, expanding these resources to exonerees is plausible. Because states al-
ready have a wealth of resources to offer, there is no excuse for services not 
to be extended to exonerees to aid them as they face distinct problems re-
entering the community. 
States without compensation statues often claim that innocent people 
convicted of crimes is simply the “cost of doing business” in the current 
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criminal justice regime, and therefore do not feel the need to take responsi-
bility for these mistakes.164 As one scholar argues, “The cost-of-doing-
business argument should be repudiated for four reasons: (1) it does not 
save the state money; (2) it leads to treatment that is unfair; (3) it creates in-
centives to continue unfair treatment; and (4) it leads States to violate the 
Constitution.”165 States do not put forth the “cost of doing business” argu-
ment in any other legal context. When states violate personal rights in every 
other aspect, they are held accountable for repairing the damage, whether 
through the federal government or the state itself. It is unfair to simply state 
that a person’s life is a “cost of doing business.” Because of the current im-
perfect system that is in place, states have a greater responsibility to protect 
individual rights and restore innocent victims. Seeking justice should be the 
state’s ultimate goal. Justice is not served when an innocent person is jailed. 
To restore the balance, states must take responsibility and compensate those 
who have been injured due to the state’s imperfect system. 
Lastly, states argue that making a victim of wrongful incarceration whole 
again is an insurmountable task.166 These individuals cannot regain the 
years spent behind bars; regardless, they should be compensated using 
monetary and noneconomic damages by the state that is accountable for the 
administration of the legal system that wrongfully incarcerated them.167 
Compensation and services do not truly correct the disturbance of an inno-
cent person’s life, but comprehensive plans are extremely helpful in assist-
ing recovery and integration back into the community.168 The same can be 
said of tort law that victims cannot truly be made whole again because the 
harm is now part of history and cannot be undone. To argue that it does not 
fully compensate and so no attempt will be made to try to help these indi-
viduals negates the legal system’s purpose. This does not excuse a failure to 
act in order to attempt to restore the victim to their pre-injured position. The 
same principles from tort theory apply in order to do everything possible to 
try to right the wrong and make a victim of wrongful conviction truly whole 
again, and this responsibility falls on the state that incarcerated them. 
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D. The Need for Restoration and Legitimacy 
Tort damages assist in providing restoration to a harmed victim.169 Theo-
ries behind tort damages suggest that culture values the litigant and wishes 
him restoration.170 This applies to wrongful convictions because the re-
establishment of the claimant, to make him whole again, does not relate to 
deterring the wrongdoer; instead the amount of damages is based wholly on 
the claimant’s request.171 Because wrongful convictions are not always 
based on government misconduct, deterrence is not the main goal. Rather, 
the goal is restoring the victim. “What should matter for both injured per-
sons and a society concerned with compensation of the injured is whether 
the tort process has a differential restorative effect for both tangible and in-
tangible loss.”172 
The proposed system includes a public manifestation that the exoneree is 
innocent. There are multiple methods to achieve this, but one form is a pub-
lic apology. Apologizing not only validates the exoneree’s injury but also 
serves to take responsibility as well as aid in restoring the victim.173 Apolo-
gies force the injurer to take responsibility for the indignity that occurred 
while showing the victim respect.174 Apologies are used in damages in 
defamation claims in tort law and translate well into wrongful convictions 
because the same issues are at stake.175 In both contexts, harm to an individ-
ual’s reputation needs to be undone. A public apology is one way to ac-
complish that and restore the individual’s legitimacy in society’s view. 
Restoration is centered on making a claimant feel valued and rebalancing 
the power between the exoneree and the system that caused the damage. 
Compensation is a starting point to recognizing the injury.176 When society 
assists wrongly incarcerated persons, and exhausts all possible options to 
aid in the restoration process, the problems exonerees face upon re-entering 
society are greatly diminished.177 Restoring a victim is the foundation to 
making an individual whole again. Restoration is necessary because when 
no one apologizes or accepts responsibility for a wrongful conviction, soci-
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ety does not accept the exoneree as innocent, and the stigma of the crime 
stays with the individual long after release.178 
Holistic compensation statutes meaningfully lend to a state’s legitimacy. 
Claimants desire to be treated fairly and with respect, and they will trust an 
authority more if the authority treats them with dignity, leading to long-
term satisfaction.179 Compensation serves as a process of restoration and 
closure as the state takes responsibility for the harm done.180 Through the 
use of money and healing services, an innocent victim can successfully be 
restored. A state taking responsibility for its mistakes reinstates not only the 
exoneree’s faith in the system but also the public perception and confidence 
in the system that they feel seeks justice.181 Therefore, the need for restora-
tion goes beyond the individual alone to serve society’s perception. “If 
compensated exonerees feel more valued than uncompensated exonerees… 
restored perceptions of social value and institutional legitimacy will foster 
increased compliance with the law.”182 
A state’s choice not to enact a compensation statute is a choice to extend 
the harm of a wrongfully convicted individual, thereby making the person 
feel even more diminished in society.183 When released from prison, exon-
erees often feel a deep mistrust for the system and a diminished legitimacy 
for the authority that can only be reconciled by comprehensive compensa-
tion.184 If the system has the capacity to fail in such a deep way as to 
wrongly send someone to prison, that individual has no hope that the sys-
tem can function properly in any context. Individuals recognize the way 
they are procedurally handled by the state as a reflection of the individual’s 
value, thus fairness in the system produces more than fair outcomes; it also 
produces a sense of restoration in the victim.185 An individual that does not 
respect a system that failed them has no reason to follow its laws. If a state 
cannot take responsibility for its own mistakes, how then can it expect its 
own citizens to take responsibility?186 For a state to maintain its legitimacy, 
it must be held accountable to compensate victims its own system wrongly 
jailed.187 
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“A comprehensive plan of reform must be both preventative and com-
pensatory. Only by working both to decrease the risk of executing the inno-
cent and to restore the innocence those who were wrongfully convicted will 
the judicial system regain its legitimacy.”188 A lack of responsibility on the 
state’s behalf in effect excuses the mistakes and misconduct within the sys-
tem, and therefore citizens have reason to believe their misconduct will be 
excused as well.189 A government only has legitimacy if the citizens respect 
it and agree to follow its rules. For a state to be a legitimate sovereign, it 
must take responsibility for errors in the system and make meaningful 
measures to repair the damage. It is uncontested that exonerations alter the 
way society views the criminal justice system; therefore, states have a nec-
essary obligation to restore the legitimacy within the system for the benefit 
of the government, public, and exonerees.190 
IV. CONCLUSION  
“Victims of wrongful conviction are often re-victimized post exoneration 
because the government fails to provide them with meaningful assis-
tance.”191 Fairness and justice are contradicted when a state releases wrong-
fully incarcerated individuals into the world as if nothing happened, therein 
worsening the harm without meaningful compensation.192 Upon release 
from prison, these victims are not in a sufficient state, economically, or oth-
erwise. When exonerees cannot find jobs, housing, transportation, and basic 
health needs, the state has failed them a second time by not taking care of 
someone wrongfully incarcerated. When a state fails to seek justice in the 
criminal system, the state has the obligation of accepting responsibility for 
the mistake and compensating those who were harmed.193 States that are 
willing to accept that responsibility and enact a holistic and comprehensive 
statute for compensation add to the state’s legitimacy and can restore the 
exoneree.194 States that do not provide sufficient comprehensive compensa-
tion in turn fail the exoneree a second time by further harming the individ-
ual.195 For the reasons set forth in this comment, it is in the state’s best in-
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terest to enact holistic compensation statutes applying tort law principles to 
achieve comprehensive relief for the wrongfully convicted.  
States need to compensate innocent persons because it is an individual’s 
right to be restored when the state’s wrongful conduct caused the injury.196 
A state therefore owes a duty to its citizens. Claimants who were wrong-
fully convicted and who faithfully return to the system that harmed them 
deserve sufficient compensation so as to truly make them whole again. 
These individuals have suffered enough and deserve to be economically and 
non-economically compensated to the best of the state’s ability to put them 
in a position as if the wrongful incarceration had never occurred. If nothing 
else, the state has a moral obligation to provide a comprehensive and holis-
tic statutory mechanism to make whole wrongly convicted individuals.197	
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